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 1 
JUDGING THE EDUCATORS: FORENSIC EVALUATION OF ACADEMIC 
JUDGEMENT 
 
 
 
There has recently been a significant spate of cases of educational institutions being sued by 
dissatisfied students.1 For decades we have had an established arena of professional negligence 
litigation into which physicians and even lawyers have been dragged as defendants (and 
sometimes ruined), but where, hitherto, teachers and lecturers have hardly ever been summoned. 
Increasingly, academic judgement is a justiciable issue. Additionally, lawyers are being 
increasingly brought into the educational arena's domestic hearings. Eversheds, the national firm 
of solicitors with a leading education practice, has a wide experience of such disputes. That firm 
has observed2 that, apart from any growth in trial work, there has been a definite increase in 
"semi-formal complaint" where students instruct lawyers to pursue grievances against 
institutions, and to represent them at hearings. 
 
In 1996, Simon Zekaria issued a writ against the Chancellor, Master and Scholars of the 
University of Cambridge alleging breach of contract and negligence.3 Mr Zekaria had studied 
for his GCSE examinations at University College School in London, but had received a low 
grade from the Midland Examining Group (now the Cambridge group) for the English 
Literature paper he sat in June 1994. He and his teachers were expecting a high grade, and the 
paper was re-marked by the Board on application by the School but a D grade was confirmed. 
The disagreement continued to the point of a third marking of the paper in June 1995 but the 
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writ claims that this too was unsatisfactory. The writ alleges that the examinations board was 
cursory and superficial, and says that, as a result, Mr Zekaria was deprived of the opportunity to 
study English at his first choice of university.  
 
A central claim of the Zekaria case that will have to be determined by the court is whether, on 
the balance of probabilities, it is true that the candidates papers were not marked fairly and with 
reasonable skill and care.4 
 
This area of law is governed by one of the most famous principles in English law: the duty of a 
person to exercise reasonable care towards his "neighbour". This rule became lapidary in a 
famous case in 1932 in which a woman successfully sued a manufacturer of ginger beer, having 
suffered illness after she drank from a bottle containing a decomposing snail. The House of 
Lords decided that ,whether or not we have contracts with them,5  we owe our neighbours, 
people who are likely to be affected by our acts and omissions, a duty to take reasonable care. 
The manufacturing process of the ginger beer company had fallen below such a standard. 
 
Lord Atkin famously noted in Donoghue v Stevenson6 in 1932 that: 
 
 "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour."7 
 
 
Since that time the law of civil negligence has expanded dramatically in its application to social 
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affairs. In Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners8 in 1964, the House of Lords extended the duty of 
care to make pure economic loss recoverable (ie where financial loss was not consequential 
upon physical injury or damage to property). The courts have, with relative ease, been able to 
define the standard of care required from people doing everyday things like driving a car or 
attacking a door handle to a door. A greater challenge, however, has come from the need to 
formulate with precision the standard required from experts like doctors and engineers. The 
requirement is made not only by the common law but also by statute. Section 13(1) of the 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 requires that in a contract fro the supply of a service a 
contract term be implied to the effect that the service be carried out with "reasonable care and 
skill".9  Experts are required to exercise a degree of care and skill that is reasonable in their 
profession. A professional will not be negligent simply because a small body of experts in the 
same field do not endorse the defendant's method of work. 
 
An early case dealing with the level of professional standards required by law was Lanphier v 
Phipos in 183810. In that case, involving an allegation of poor treatment by a doctor, Chief 
Justice Tindal said that: 
 
 "Every person who enters a learned profession undertakes to bring to the 
exercise of it a reasonable degree of care and skill.  He does not undertake, if he 
is an attorney, that at all events you shall gain your case, nor does a surgeon 
undertake that he will perform a cure; nor does he undertake to use the highest 
possible degree of skill. There may be persons who have higher education and 
greater advantages than he has, but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable and 
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competent degree of skill..."11 
 
 
The application of that principle to those engaged in the processes of education and examining 
is clear in that a single band of skill is described. This principle was further detailed and 
confirmed in Bolam v Frien Hospital Management Committee12 in 1957, in which McNair J., 
expressed a formula which has become adopted as the modern benchmark for the standard of 
skill required of experts. The case concerned the conduct of a doctor performing electro-
convulsive therapy, but the formula has been recognised as the one to be used in respect of other 
fields of expertise.13  McNair J., said that in the ordinary case which does not involve any 
special care or skill, negligence in law means a failure to do some act which a reasonable man in 
the circumstances would do, or the doing of some act which a reasonable man in the 
circumstances would not do. In the ordinary case the relevant standard is that of "the ordinary 
man", that is, "the man on the top of the Clapham omnibus".14 But, McNair J., went on: 
 
 "where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or 
competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not 
the test of the man on the top of the Clapham omnibus, because he has not got 
this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising 
and professing to have that special skill. A man need not posses the highest 
expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the 
ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art."15 
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Particular difficulties will arise if the judiciary has to cultivate a detailed development the law of 
negligence in relation to the delivery of education. One challenge will come from the rule that 
although deviation from proper practice generates liability, the nature of "proper practice" is 
affected by time and place. As Tony Weir, one leading authority in the field, has observed: "one 
cannot demand from a garage in the West Highlands of Scotland the same standard of 
expedition and professional competence which can be hoped for in the metropolis".16  
 
One case (actually about ear-piercing) is instructive on the point that the courts accept there can 
be a sliding-scale of lawful standards within the boundaries of professionalism. In Philips v. 
William Whiteley17 in 1937, a woman became ill after what she alleged was negligently-
performed ear-piercing carried out by a man who worked for a London jewellers. The jewellers 
to whom Mrs Philips went, Whiteleys, did not employ anyone competent to pierce ears but sub-
contracted with a man, Mr Couzens, from another jewellers to do the operation. Mr Couzens 
arrived at Whiteleys on the appointed day. He asked for a glass of water into which he put lysol, 
a disinfectant. He used this to disinfect his fingers and the instrument he used to pierce Mrs 
Philips' ears. He also gave evidence that he had disinfected the instrument in a flame before 
packing it into his back when leaving for Whiteleys. 
 
Two days later, and in accordance with a plan made weeks earlier, Mrs Philips went into 
hospital for a major operation to remove her gall bladder. During her stay her ears troubled her, 
and then she suffered a very bad neck infection which required surgery to open and drain a very 
painful abscess. 
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Mrs. Philips alleged negligence against Mr Couzens, and thus Whiteleys who were legally 
responsible for his work, in that he failed to render sterile the piercing instrument that he used. 
In his judgement, finding for the defendants, Goddard J. said that while it was admitted that Mr 
Couzens did not use the same precautions of procuring an aseptic condition of his instruments 
as a doctor or a surgeon would use, he could not be called upon to use that degree of care: 
 
 "Whiteleys have to see that whoever they employ for the operation uses the 
standard of care and skill that may be expected from a jeweller, and, of course, if 
the operation is negligently performed - if, for instance,  a wholly unsuitable 
instrument were used, so that the ear was badly torn, or something of that sort 
happened - undoubtedly they would be liable.  So, too, if they did not take that 
degree of care to see that the instruments were clean which one would expect a 
person of the training and the standing of a jeweller to use.  To say, however, 
that a jeweller warrants or undertakes that he will use instruments which have 
the degree of surgical cleanliness that a surgeon brings about when he is going to 
perform a serious operation, or indeed any operation, is, I think, putting the 
matter too high....I do not think that a jeweller holds himself out as a surgeon or 
professes that he is going to conduct the operation of piercing a lady's ears by 
means of aseptic surgery, about which it is not to be supposed that he knows 
anything."18 [emphasis added]. 
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It is quite possible that this principle could apply to pedagogic and examination matters.  Will 
the standards to be expected of academics and examiners depend upon the level of their 
experience and qualifications?  There is now, for example, an intense and intensifying 
commercial competition between GCSE and A-level examination boards to recruit more 
examination centres. It is foreseeable that sooner or later an examination board might be 
tempted or pressured into cutting some of its overhead costs by reducing the number of 
examiners for each thousand of its scripts (thus increasing the workload and strain on any given 
examiner) or try to reduce its operating costs by reducing the number of senior, richly-
experienced, and highly-qualified examiners.  Looking at the law as expressed in Philips, it is a 
moot point whether such reduced standards on the part of an examination board would have a 
significant legal implication; but, in any event, the possibility of an increased legal jeopardy 
cannot be discounted. 
 
The cases of alleged medical negligence show that the courts have experienced great difficulty 
in evaluating the conduct of specialists in an esoteric field. Some educational litigation revolves 
around points of alleged organisational or procedural negligence (in which the courts are 
experienced arbiters) but many grievances from pupils and students today concern accusations 
of bad academic judgement in relation to grades for assignments, dissertations, examinations, 
and degree classification. As and when the courts have to judge the quality of academic opinion 
the issues will be possibly even more vexed than those concerning the clinical judgement and 
performance of physicians. 
 
A science like medicine (pace those who emphasise the art of medical practice) can at least, in 
Gary Slapper 
 
 
 
 8 
many cases, demonstrate conclusively that there are good and bad ways of doing things. Thus, it 
is better to inquire about allergy before prescribing an antibiotic; it is better to lie a patient on his 
back than on his front when performing cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, and so forth. When one 
turns from Medicine to Economics, History, Theology, or Sociology it can immediately be seen 
that good theories and basic assumptions within the subjects are not so conclusively 
demonstrable in the same way. If the courts are struggling to make decisive and fair judgements 
in medical cases, they will perhaps become involved in some awfully fraught, even hopeless 
wrangles on scholarly matters of a more nebulous or political nature.19 The true peril of this 
quagmire can be appreciated when one remembers that even on current medical cases where the 
standard practice of a significant body of practitioners can be established, the courts have still 
not demurred from ruling that such a group of doctors was wrong. Thus in Newell v Goldburg20 
it was held that by 1985 a doctor who did not warn a vasectomy patient of the risk of natural 
restoration (of the surgically severed vas), and thus the risk of pregnancy, could not be 
considered as acting reasonably or responsibly, despite the fact that many doctors did not, at the 
time of the case, give such warnings.   
 
Conversely, it was held by the Court of appeal in Defreitas v O'Brien and Another21 that 
notwithstanding evidence that a relatively small body of surgeons who regularly performed a 
certain operation would apparently have operated in the circumstances which arose in this case, 
it was still open to the judge to find that such a small percentage of surgeons constituted a 
"responsible" body of practitioners.22 
 
As Davies has very clearly shown23, the English courts have tended to resolve that, provided 
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institutions follow the rules of natural justice in the way they examine or deal with appeals, they 
may retain autonomy in respect of their academic judgements.  The position is best encapsulated 
in the perspicacious judgement of Mr Justice Sedley in  R v Higher Education Funding Council, 
ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery24. He noted that the court can only query an evaluation 
made of student work by academics where there are grounds for doubting the basis of such an 
evaluation. He stated: 
 
 "We would hold that where what is sought to be impugned is on the evidence no 
more than an informed exercise of academic judgement, fairness alone will not 
require reasons to be given. This is not to say for a moment that academic 
decisions are beyond challenge. A mark, for example, awarded at an examiners' 
meeting where irrelevant and damaging personal factors have been allowed to 
enter into the evaluation of the candidate's written papers something more than 
an informed exercise of academic judgement. Where evidence shows that 
something extraneous has entered into the process of academic judgement, one 
of two results may follow depending on the nature of the fault: either the 
decision will fall without more, or the court may require reasons to be given, so 
that the decision can either be seen to be sound or (absent reasons) be inferred to 
be flawed. But purely academic judgements, in our view, will as a rule, not be in 
the class of case...where the nature and impact of the decision itself call for 
reasons as a routine aspect of procedural fairness."25 
 
Furthermore, as Davies has argued,26 each subject has its own specialist language, rather than 
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one for any academic profession as a whole, and "divisions between subject disciplines may be 
seen as constituting individual professions within academia". The clearer the existence of such 
specialism, the more difficult the task of judicial re-evaluation of professional opinion. Another 
Divisional Court judicial review decision, R v Manchester Metropolitan University, ex parte 
Nolan27 also recognised the sovereignty of the examination board on matters of pure academic 
opinion.  When courts in other jurisdictions have occasionally succumbed to re-evaluating 
student work with the help of experts for both the complainant student and the examination 
board the mission has usually begotten more problems than it has solved. In one case cited by 
Davies28, for example, the American court decided that an academic decision was `arbitrary and 
capricious' 
having heard evidence from both sides about the grades awarded to examination papers. In 
court, however, the experts attributed widely disparate marks to the same piece of work - grades 
ranging from 57 per cent to 94 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two factors seem to be involved in the steady rise in legal actions involving educational issues. 
The first is the general context of society becoming more rights-conscious and litigious. This is 
the age of the Charter and a profusion of media legal advice columns and programmes. Charters 
have also been issued by the Department for Education and, by Universities themselves to assist 
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in the competition to recruit good students.  
 
The second is the growing personal financial stake in education contributed by students and 
their parents. Many students now work long hours to fund their studies, or are supported by 
parents who make great financial sacrifices. It has been estimated that the average cost of a 
degree to a student today is over 10,000. According to a recent survey by Barclays Bank, the 
average debt of finalists in 1996 was up 32 per cent on last year. Another recent piece of 
research by the Policy Studies Institute (based on interviews with 1,971 students at 73 
institutions) found that the average student received 3,615 income in the 1995/6 academic year 
and spent 5,091.29. The shortfall was funded by student loans, commercial credit, savings, and 
delayed payment of bills.  The study also found that half of all students questioned worked in 
employment for 10 hours per week. Mature students were in a worse position than seven years 
ago and were generally finding it very difficult to make ends meet. In such a setting, student 
dissatisfaction with course quality or with exam results is more clearly foreseeable than it was 
twenty years ago.  
 
Litigation against universities is not just confined to actions for negligence or breach of contract. 
In 1996, a ten year campaign by a former Bristol University student ended when his case was 
rejected in the Court of Appeal. In 1986, Francis Foecke was originally awarded a first-class 
degree in mathematics. He had not been regarded by his tutors as an especially bright student 
and yet, although he took 13 finals papers (an unprecedented number), he gained first-class 
results in all. An inquiry was ordered after the discovery that his answers exactly mirrored the 
model answers prepared by the examiner, including some errors, and Mr Foecke first-class 
Gary Slapper 
 
 
 
 12 
degree was withdrawn. Mr Foecke, who spent 50,000 pursuing various legal cases including a 
libel action against the university, has now indicated he may take the matter to the European 
courts.30  
 
Another recent litigation development with potentially significant consequences in the realm of 
education is the legal action of two former pupils who are suing their schools for having given 
them a poor education.31  The claims are based upon the reports of governmental inspectors 
which `failed' certain schools in a national survey. One case concerns an 18-year-old girl who 
left school three years ago with no GCSEs. The other case involves an 18-year-old boy who 
received poor grades despite being expected by some to do very well. The litigants are suing for 
the cost of tuition and maintenance while they study to re-take exams, and for loss of earnings 
due to delayed entry on to the jobs market. If successful, the case could constitute precedent for 
children in similar positions at all schools failed by government inspectors.  
 
 
 
During the last twenty years the volume of litigation against doctors, and health authorities has 
grown significantly. There are currently about 20,000 claims outstanding against the NHS. 
About 2,500 have a value in excess of 100,000. As a result the cost of medical insurance for 
doctors has soared and the art of "defensive medicine" has burgeoned, whereby practitioners are 
encouraged to quickly resort to a procedure which will leave them least open to legal attack 
even if such a procedure is drastic and not necessarily in the best interests of a patient. The 
proportion of babies delivered by Caesarian, for example, has quadrupled since 1977.32 
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The immunity from court actions enjoyed by lecturers and examiners has resulted from social 
axiom rather than legal rule, but student indulgence or reverence of lecturers is not what it used 
to be. If educational litigation goes through as exponential a growth as medical litigation then 
we might well see educators having to take out legal insurance and practices like "defensive 
grading" and "defensive lecturing". Whether these will be conducive to the public good is a 
matter of debate. 
 
 
Dr. Gary Slapper 
Principal Lecturer in Law,  
The Law School, 
Staffordshire University 
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Stoke-on-Trent 
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